

Bhartṛhari on A 1.1.45 *ig yaṇaḥ samprasāraṇam*

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One cannot doubt but that in discussing ‘the eight topics’ (*aṣṭaka*) in his *Vākyapadīya* and *Vṛtti* Bhartṛhari bases himself on a long tradition of usage and grammar. When Bhartṛhari develops his theory of language there, as a matter of course, he gets the utmost of the grammatical discussions devoted by Kātyāyana and Patañjali. In doing so, interestingly, Bhartṛhari seems to be interested in what underlies their interpretations of a given grammatical rule and not in giving his original interpretation of the rule. Needless to say, this is because what matters to him is how grammarians account for usages. This paper focuses on one of such rules in whose interpretations Bhartṛhari is interested, A 1.1.45 *ig yaṇaḥ samprasāraṇam*.

A 1.1.45 is known as the rule which provides that *i-*, *u-*, *ṛ-*, and *ḷ-*vowels (*ik*) that replace *y-*, *v-*, *r-*, *l-*semivowels (*yaṇ*) are called *samprasāraṇa*, and this term denotes also the replacement of those semivowels by those vowels. This interpretation of the rule in question is based on the third vārttika on the rule: *vibhaktiviśeṣanirdeśas tu jñāpaka ubhayasaṃjñātvasya*. In this vārttika Kātyāyana proposes that A 1.1.45 is to assign the name *samprasāraṇa* both to a set of sounds (*varṇasaṃjñā*; [Bhāṣya] *ig yo yaṇaḥ sthāne varṇaḥ sa samprasāraṇasaṃjñā bhavati*) and to a sentence (*vākyasaṃjñā*; [Bhāṣya] *ig yaṇa ity etad vākyam samprasāraṇasaṃjñam bhavati*). According to Patañjali, when the genitive or ablative form of the term *samprasāraṇa* is used as in A 6.3.139 *samprasāraṇasya* or A 6.1.108 *samprasāraṇāc ca*, this term is treated as *varṇasaṃjñā*; whereas, when the nominative form of this term is used as in A 6.1.13 *ṣyaṇaḥ samprasāraṇam putrapatyos tatpuruṣe*, the term is treated as *vākyasaṃjñā*.

In his *Mahābhāṣyadīpikā* Bhartṛhari comments on the *Mahābhāṣya* to A 1.1.45, so that we might well assume that he is fully aware that Patañjali there makes an attempt to work out and find a solution in either of the *varṇasaṃjñā*- and *vākyasaṃjñā*-views. In his *Vākyapadīya* and *Vṛtti*, however, he confines himself to the *vākyasaṃjñā*-view which is put forward in the first vārttika and to the *ubhayasaṃjñā*-view which is set forth in the third vārttika.

Bhartṛhari refers to A 1.1.45 in *VP* 2.479; *Vṛtti* on *VP* 2.40; *Vṛtti* on *VP* 2.372; *Vṛtti* on *VP* 2.444; *Vṛtti* on *VP* 2.479, in order to illustrate the following two points:

1. A sentence meaning is conveyed by a single indivisible linguistic unit;
2. There can be a polysemic sentence which has one form with two or more meanings.

This paper is concerned primarily with Bhartṛhari’s treatment of issues concerning the *vākyasaṃjñā*-view, to which he resorts so as to illustrate the first point. It can easily be imagined that the idea that the sentence *ig yaṇaḥ [bhavati]* is referred to by the term *samprasāraṇa* strongly attracted him when he constructed his theory of a sentence and a sentence meaning. The aim of this paper is, therefore, to see how he incorporates the *vākyasaṃjñā*-view into his arguments about what a sentence and a sentence meaning are. The *Vṛtti* on *VP* 2.40 shall necessarily be discussed in detail. Unfortunately, however, the text of the *Vṛtti* edited by Iyer has many textual cruxes. On the basis of not only Iyer’s edition but also Prof. Ashok Aklujkar’s unpublished edition (presented in Kyoto seminar on the *Vṛtti* to the *Vākyapadīya*, 2003), therefore, I will try to understand the point made by Bhartṛhari there.