

**Characterizations of Mind in Indian and Tibetan Literature:
Concepts of *manas*, *kliṣṭamanas*, and *ālayavijñāna*
in the Yogācāra Tradition**

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This paper will be concerned with Buddhist concepts of mind as found in the Yogācāra tradition (e.g. in the *Yogācārabhūmi*, the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*[*bhāṣya*], the *Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā*, and the *Triṃśikāvijñaptibhāṣya*) and related Abhidharma texts (e.g. the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*). The authors of these works use various expressions in this context, ranging from *vijñāna* (“perception”), *manas* (“mental faculty”), *manodhātu* (“mental faculty as element”) to *kliṣṭamanas* (“notion of ‘I’”) and *ālayavijñāna*. Of interest here are questions concerning the functions of these constituents of the person and the relations between them. So far, for example, it could not be determined with certainty whether the theory of *kliṣṭamanas* is related to the traditional idea of *manas*. In some definitions *manas* is mentioned as an aspect of *vijñāna* insofar as it provides the basis for the subsequent moment of mind. The background of this remark must be the traditional assumption (found e.g. in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*) that *manāyatana* (or *manodhātu*) is the basis for the subsequent moment of perception. The *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, however, explains that the part of *vijñāna* which is called *manas* is to be known as *kliṣṭamanas*. A passage in the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* describing the *ālayavijñāna*, which is preserved in Tibetan and Chinese translations and which has been edited and translated into Japanese by Noriaki Hakamaya in 1979, might lead to further insight into this problem. In this passage *manas* is not explicitly referred to as *kliṣṭamanas*, but it is characterized as being bound to “the notion ‘I am [this *skandha*]’” (*asmimāna*) and as constantly arising together with the *ālayavijñāna*. Another important aspect of mental activity mentioned in some Buddhist works belonging to the Yogācāra tradition is the specification of the mental process beginning with the actual perception and concluding in the impressing of imprints (*vāsanā*) in the “store mind”. Some authors obviously presumed a sequence of different kinds of mental perception (*manovijñāna*), including an “investigative” (*paryeṣaka*) and an “imagining” (*vikalpaka*) perception.

The paper will also focus on the evolution of the *kliṣṭamanas* theory within Tibetan Buddhism. Although the Tibetans traditionally consider concepts of the Yogācāra tradition to be inferior to Madhyamaka teachings, Yogācāra texts are none the less included in the curriculum of Tibetan Buddhist seminars. The Abhidharma of the Yogācāras is represented in the Tibetan tradition primarily by the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* and a collection of works composed by Tibetan authors which deals exclusively with the Yogācāra concepts of *kliṣṭamanas* (Tib. *yid*) and *ālayavijñāna* (Tib. *kun gzhi rnam par shes pa*). This literary tradition is based on Indian Yogācāra sources as for instance the *Mahāyānasamgraha* and the *Triṃśikāvijñaptibhāṣya*. Its starting point goes back to the famous Dge lugs pa scholar Tsong kha pa (1357-1419), who authored a work on this topic entitled *Yid dang kun gzhi’i dka’ ba’i gnas rgya cher ’grel pa*. At present seven commentaries on Tsong kha pa’s treatise are available, mostly written in the 18th and 19th centuries by Dge lugs pa scholars active in one of the main monastic centres of Tibet. The Tibetan “*yid dang kun gzhi* literature” marks another step in the philosophical understanding of the nature of mind, which—apart from an English translation of Tsong kha pa’s text—has so far not been investigated in more detail by western scholarship.