Buddhist criticism on the existence of universal (samanya) depending on the relation between what is to be indicated (vyangya) and the indicator(vyanjaka) held by Vaisesikas

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Dharmakirti criticizes the existence of universal held by Vaisesikas in his PVSV, pointing out the impossibility of cognition of universal as follows:

There is no cognition of what is to be indicated (vyangya=universal) without a cognition of indicator (vyanjaka=individual). Why must the reverse be accepted between the universal and its possessor (=individual) [by Vaisesikas] //156//

...Because the universal is what is to be indicated by the individual, wherever is no indicator(=the individual), there is no cognition (of the universal). That is also mistake, because there is no relation between what is to be indicated and the indicator

Vaisesikas insists in Vyomavati that the instrument of indication of the universal (=upalaksana) is a concomitant cognition (anuvrttabuddhi) in the manner of "this is cow", and "this is cow". And also a common characteristic (samanyalaksana)) of an individual appearing in a judgemental perception (savikalpa) is an indicator (vyanjaka). The term vyanjaka is used as the mark to prove or to indicate the existence of universal, and the term vyangya is used as what is to be indicated by the indicator.

In Nyayakandali, the universal of the cow is what is to be indicated(vyangya) by the body possessing the dewlap and such other limbs; and the universal of horse is what is to be indicated by the body possessing the mein and so forth; and the universal of the jar is what is to be indicated by a body having a peculiarly shaped neck.

Here, the dewlap and such other limbs are the common characteristic of cow appearing in a judgemental perception (vikalpa), and the indicator(vyanjaka) of existence of cowness.

Vaisesikas adopts two kinds of vyanjaka and vyangya; namely in the case of sense-organ and its object and in the case of an individual or a common characteristic of individual and an universal.

First one is examined by Enrich Frauwallner in his Geschichte Der Indischen

Philosophie II Band (pp.51f.)and also Karin Preisendanz in her Studien zu Nyayasutra III.1 Mit dem Nyayattvaloka Vacaspati Misras II Teil 2 fn260.

In the case of sense-organ and its object, vyanjaka is a manifestor, and vyangya is what is to be manifested, or that which appears.

In the case of an universal and an individual, vyanjaka is an indicator and vyangya is what is to be indicated. Many scholars adopts the term" manifestation of universal". If "manifestation of universal"means "appearance of universal", it is not acceptable. If

"manifestation of universal" means "indication of universal", it is acceptable.