

On the relationship between scripturally based inference (*āgamāśritānumāna*)
and the fallacious thesis being contradicted by scripture (*āgamavirodha*)

Shinya Moriyama (Shinshu University)

As is well known, Dharmakīrti's central tenet of scriptural authority is the so-called threefold analysis (*dbpyad pa gsum*), which functions for sorting out a reliable scripture with regard to radically inaccessible matters (*atyantaparokṣa*) from unreliable scriptures through perception, inference functioning by the force of real entities (*vastubalapravṛttānumāna*), and scripturally based inference (*āgamāśritānumāna*). Of the three kinds of means of valid cognition, in spite of Tom Tillemans's detailed study on the scripturally based inference, its concrete figure is not entirely clear simply because Dharmakīrti did not formulate the inference in an explicit reasoning (*prayoga*). In the *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti* on v. 215, Dharmakīrti explains the inference with the following example: "After one has provisionally accepted (*abhyupagamyā*) *adharma* as being in the nature of desire and other [passions] or as arising from them, there is no teaching of bathing, *agnihotra* sacrifice and others in order to abandon the [*adharma*]." From the description (and also from PVSV ad PV I 334), it is difficult to know the exact reasoning of the scripturally based inference. Only one clue is Śākyabuddhi's commentary on the verse (Derge *ed.*, 245a5f.), where he formulates a reasoning based on *vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhi* as follows:

[*Vyāpti*.] Whatever does not remove the cause of a certain thing (x) does not remove the thing (x), for example, sweet, cold, and oily things do not remove phlegmatic disease.

[*Pakṣadharmitā*.] Bathing and others (e.g., *agnihotra*) do not remove the cause of *adharma*.

Although it is still uncertain whether we may regard the above inference as an explicit example of the scripturally based inference, it is noteworthy that the origin of the above reasoning together with its example can be found in a section of Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇaviniścaya* III (Derge *ed.*, 197a4-5), where one kind of the fallacious thesis (*pakṣābhāsa*), the so-called *āgamavirodha*, is discussed concerning theses on radically inaccessible matters like "*Dharma* does not bring happiness after one dies." In this section, against an opponent who claims that the thesis, "Bathing does not purify *adharma*," is also conceived to be contradicted by the acceptance of a scripture that admits the purification of *adharma* by bathing, Dharmakīrti provides an excursive account that such a scripture is unacceptable because of its internal inconsistency. In this context, the argument similar to Śākyabuddhi's reasoning appears. In this presentation, starting with the examination of the PVin's argument, I aim to consider the relationship between scripturally based inference and the fallacy of thesis called *āgamavirodha*.