The art of argumentation in context: Dialogue with the Jainas

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The classical Indian paradigm of logic can be characterized both as a theory of the inferences that are practiced by cognitive agents and as a theory of the processes they use to mutually convince themselves.

First, as soon as we give credit to the idea that a logic in the proper sense should be able to convincingly explain the inferences that are effectively practiced and, from this, can claim to norm them in a significant way, i.e. that logic is conceived as a tentative to explain already existing theories of knowledge, logic becomes a pluralist discipline (John Woods, *Paradox and para consistency : conflict resolution in abstract sciences*).

Secondly, being meant to convince somebody within a pluralist frame amounts to be confronted with the question 'what one is to do when confronted to a plurality of sets of propositions, each she has some good reasons to accept, and yet that put together are incompatible?'

The aim of this talk is to perform a rapprochement between a Jaina attempt of the 9th century to answer this question, namely the one of Prabhācandra in his *Prameya-kamala-mārtaṇḍa*, and the attempt of a contemporary pluralist approach, namely the one of Dialogical Logic (Erlangen school). What is at stake in doing so is to compare some consequences of the central position of the subject of knowledge in the Jaina logic and in the contemporary logic, that forgot the subject when it gained powerful technical tools throughout the developments of mathematical logic and that tends to reinstate it.

Several features are meant to be shown within this connexion, the one on which we will concentrate is a vision of logic in which argumentation

has the pragmatic function to validate some inferences in relation to a given perspective. More precisely, the dialogical presentation between an Opponent and a Proponent in order to establish a given proposition leads us to conceive the specification of local logical rules as the specification of a certain type of Opponent. In a very similar way, the *anekāntavāda* (theory of non-one-sidedness) leads the Jaina logicians to conceive a theory of inference and argumentation, the *nayavāda* (theory of standpoints), in which we have to specify the standpoint at stake (Piotr Balcerowicz, 'Some remarks on the naya method' in *Essays in Jaina philosophy and religion*). One way in which we can interpret this is to say that we don't discuss using the same logical rules depending on the philosophical school within which a statement is to be established.