On Bhadrabāhu's Logic

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In the *Tattvasaṃgraha*, Śāntarakṣita refers to the Jaina theory of inference ascribed to Pātrasvāmin who regards '*anyathānupapannatva*' (inexplicability otherwise) as the one and only characteristic of logical reason. According to his view there is no use for examples if '*anyathānupapannatva*' exists in logical reason. Siddhasena Divākara, author of the *Nyāyāvatāra*, also interprets his logic by utilizing the notion of '*anyathānupapannatva*', and does not look at the external example necessarily as a syllogistic member. For him the establishment of what to be proved can be secured solely by '*antarvyāpti*' (internal concomitance) without any help of examples. After them Jaina authors have appealed to the '*antarvyāpti'* to support their theory of logic and have approved a syllogism without examples. Thus, it is safe to say that Jaina logic is characterized by '*antarvyāpti'* and can be called 'deductive logic'.

Although Pātrasvāmin and Siddhasena have propounded their deductive logic, it is not the case that the Jainas before them had left the logic out of consideration. It is true that they are the first authors who try to establish the theory of logic systematically, but the traces of logical thinking can be found even before them. In fact, we come across the words '*aṇumāṇa*' (inference), '*heu*' (logical reason) and so forth in Jaina *Āgama*s. And Bhadrabāhu, being active prior to the two logicians, had developed the logical thinking in his commentaries on the *Āgama*s. Therefore, Jaina authors have already introduced the logic to their religious system even in Canonical literature.

As has been pointed out by Vidyābhūṣaṇa in his *History of Indian Logic*, Bhadrabāhu refers to the syllogism consisting of ten members in the *Dasaveyāliyanijjutti*. Moreover, he introduces various kinds of syllogism, such as one-, two- and five-membered, and does not limit the members of syllogism to ten in number. He further concedes that all kinds of syllogism are optional and valid. Then questions may arise: Is the example necessarily stated in his syllogism? Does the example play a role in securing the validity of his syllogism? Is his logic 'deductive'?

To answer these questions, we have to pay attention to his intention to introduce the logic to Jaina commentaries. Bhadrabāhu utilizes the logic neither to give reliability to his debates against other schools, nor to demonstrate the existence of some entity for his opponents. Further he does not regard the logic as the direct means of achieving liberation. Therefore, his purpose in introducing the logic is quite different from that of other schools, such as *Naiyāyika*, *Sāṃkhya* and Buddhist. The aim of this paper is to disclose the features of Bhadrabāhu's logic by investigating what he wanted to establish in the first place. Especially I would like to shed light on the function of example in his syllogism, and make clear the problem as to whether his logic is deductive or inductive.