

**Title: The Prābhākara Influence on Raghunātha Śiromaṇi's
Padārthatattvanirūpaṇa**

It is a known fact that Raghunātha Śiromaṇi in his Padārthatattvanirūpaṇa has digressed considerably from the traditional seven-category formula. Raghunātha himself declares that his penchant for reason has worked behind whatever digression he has ever made—arthānām yuktisiddhānām maduktānām prayatnataḥ--sarvadarśanasiddhāntavirodhenaiva darśanam. His declaration makes it clear that his views are too rationally independent to befit the compartment of any particular system. That he is not bound by any blind allegiance, becomes obvious when he, even ignoring the views of the Vaiśeṣikas sometimes, accepts many a conclusion adopted by the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā introduced by Guru or Prābhākara Miśra. The Prābhākara influence becomes evident when he, in opposition to the Vaiśeṣika tradition accepts śakti and saṃkhyā as distinct categories of the real or refutes the categorial status of viśeṣa. The argument why saṃkhyā (number) is to be accepted as a separate category, not as a mere quality—this question has been handled in the same manner by Raghunātha and Rāmānujācāryya—a Prābhākara of later origin. It is held by both the Vaiśeṣika and the Prābhākara system that a quality cannot be located in another quality. But number is taken to be a property of Quality too. Raghunātha's argument in favor of recognizing śakti (causal efficacy) as a distinct of the real, however, differs from that of the Prābhākaras.

Amazingly enough, Raghunātha, very much like the Prābhākaras speaks of samavāya or inherence as being many. Śālikanātha in the Prakaraṇapañcikā highlights the points in which the Prābhākara attitude differs from the Vaiśeṣika one. His commentator Jaipuri Nārāyaṇabhatta advances the argument that samavāya differs in accordance with the difference in the relation, because it is a relation in essence, just like conjunction. Raghunātha's argument is not in the same vein. He argues, if samavāya was one and same, sparsā samavāya would have been the same as the gandha samavāya, thereby inviting a contingency of water's having smell.

It is no less interesting that at least one of the arguments advanced by both Śālikanātha and Raghunātha against recognizing sattā as a common generality inhering in all substances, qualities and actions conveys the same tune. Even without having sattā as a character, generality etc. are labeled as sat (existent). So where is any force in the Vaiśeṣika argument that sattā accounts for one's usage—sat sat in respect of dravya, guṇa and karman?

It is equally intriguing to find out that the Prābhākara standpoint in opposition to the Vaiśeṣika insistence on the imperceptibility of vāyu (air), has been approved by many Neologicians including Raghunātha.

In the conclusion we emphasize that we do not expect a complete agreement between the Prābhākaras and Raghunātha. There are several places where the Vaiśeṣika metaphysics and ontology have left a tremendous influence on the Prābhākaras themselves. So it will be wrong to assume that on every issue Raghunātha took cudgels against the Vaiśeṣika tradition under the influence of the Prābhākara.