

## The role of the two aspects of Extrinsic Theory of Validity (*parataḥprāmāṇyavāda*) in Udayana's Rational Theology

Udayana is highly esteemed for his systematization of the proof for God (Īśvara) as the creator of the universe and as the omniscient author of the Veda, in his chief work, the *Nyāyakusumāñjali* (NKus).

NKus consists of five chapters. Its subject-matter, *i.e.*, a series of the positive proofs for the existence of God, is elaborated in the last chapter. In the first four chapters, Udayana argues over many kinds of philosophical topics and connect these arguments with his theology directly or indirectly. For example, the creation of the universe or the non-eternity of the Veda, which are the conclusions of the second chapter, are regarded as presupposition for some of the proofs presented in the last chapter.

In this way, some proofs in the last chapter presupposes doctrines such as creation of the universe, which is idiosyncratic to his school. This, for CHEMPARATHY [1972: p.134], causes Udayana's argument to deviate from the domain of philosophy.

In this presentation, I will raise the following two problems: (a) How are such arguments as presumption for his theology constructed in NKus?, and (b) is it the case that such arguments themselves are more dogmatic? First, targeting the second chapter of NKus, I will clarify the structure of the chapter. Then, focusing on the Extrinsic Theory of Validity which is discussed in the beginning of this chapter, I will examine how the two aspects of Extrinsic Theory (*utpatti & jñapti*) are incorporated into his theology and how they contribute to it.

With respect to *utpatti*, or origination, the logical relationship between this and the postulation of God is rather easily understood.

On the other hand, with respect to *jñapti*, or justification, its relationship with his theology, if any, is tacitly stated. In this argument, Udayana concludes that there must exist ultimate standard by which one can finally justify a cognition. Nevertheless, he does not mention for whom and in which case such ultimate standard for justification is accessible. This conclusion implies that if there is an omniscient being, all the cognitions and statements, including the Vedic statements, can be justified.

This theory does not directly contribute to his theology, for it cannot logically deduce the existence of an omniscient being but it would be, at best, collateral evidence for it. Nevertheless, it can be said that Udayana describes, through this argument, the limits of empirical justification by finite human beings, from an empirical viewpoint apart from dogmatic doctrines.

CHEMPARATHY[1972]: *An Indian Rational Theology: An Introduction to Udayana's Nyāyakusumāñjali*, Publications of the De Nobili Research Library, Vienna.