

The little girl who knew her brother would be coming home: *ārṣajñāna* in *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha*, *Nyāyakandalī* and *Vyomavatī*

The following paper deals with how *ārṣajñāna* (sagic cognition) is conceptualized in Praśastapāda's *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* (PDS), Śridhāra's *Nyāyakandalī* (NKd) and Vyomaśiva's *Vyomavatī* (Vy). The analysis takes its point of departure in the differences between the *Nyāyasūtra* and *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* commentarial traditions regarding the classification of *yogipratyakṣa* (yogic perception), *ārṣajñāna* and *siddhadarśana* (vision of the accomplished).

Ārṣajñāna is enumerated and distinguished in PDS as one of four kinds of *vidyā* (knowing), where *pratyakṣa* (sense-perception), *anumāna* (inferential process) and *smṛti* (memory) make up the other three. The distinction of sagic cognition is retained in the commentaries NKd, Vy and *Kiraṇāvālī* (Ki) as well as in non-commentarial texts such as *Nyāyalīlāvatī*. It also appears in both Candrānandana's and Śankara Miśra's commentaries.

There are a number of problems pertaining to how sagic cognition has been interpreted in the secondary discourse on Vaiśeṣika. *Ārṣajñāna* is seldom taken into consideration at all in secondary treatments of Vaiśeṣika epistemology and when it is mentioned it is sometimes stated that in the later texts it is subsumed under *yogipratyakṣa*. Although this reduction is made in some texts, for example by the Naiyāyikas Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, Bhāsarvajñā it is not apparent in any of the texts in the VS commentarial tradition taken into account here and not even in such a late text as *Nyāyalīlāvatī*. There is also a tendency, in the secondary accounts, to speak of sagic cognition as a non-worldly (*alaukika*) cognition. In the above VS commentarial texts, however, it seems to be the individuals having the cognition that are described as *alaukika* and not the cognition itself.

I will try to clarify the conceptions of sagic cognition apparent in the above sources and examine the implications this might have for a somewhat grander objective of a mapping of the semantic landscape of cognition (*jñāna*) and knowledge in Vaiśeṣika texts. Important questions in this mapping are how and by what means cognitions are classified, differentiated and inter-connected. These issues serve as a guideline for the present paper as well.

Anna-Pya Sjödin (PhD Indology)
Södertörn University
Department of Culture and Communication
School of Philosophy
Huddinge
Sweden
(anna-pya.sjodin@sh.se)